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Searching for the Right Way to Count
Veto Players in Argentina’s First Democratic Decade
ANDREEA NICUŢAR
In 1983 Argentina made the transition to democracy after the demise of a seven 
year military dictatorship entangled in an economic crisis, a lost war with Great 
Britain (the Falkland War) and the gruesome burden of its numerous victims and their 
relatives in the internal ”Dirty War”. The first civilian president after the last military 
junta, Raul Alfonsin was a member of one of the two main political parties of the new 
polity and a human rights activist, and the first president to hand power at the end of 
its mandate to another civilian president in a peaceful and lawful manner since 1928. 
Thus, despite some previous, short-term experiences with democratic institutions in 
the 20th century, punctuated by several military coups and military juntas, the 1983 
transition can be considered a foundational moment of the Argentine democracy, 
triggering a difficult process of democratization and institutional building of the new 
political regime and leading to a difficult process of democratic consolidation. 
In this paper I will adopt a processual perspective to analyze the manner in 
which the progressive formation of a stable pattern of elite interactions contributed 
to the most challenging task of the consolidation of the young Argentine democracy, 
that of institution building – a process of both progressive learning from past 
interactions for the political elites and one of a more formal accommodation to new 
institutional constraints. In other words, these two lines of evaluation of institution 
building amount to a lengthier process of institutionalization of rules and norms that 
is at the same time the result of injunctions from various actors and the incremental 
process through which institutions disentangle, build through norms and experience 
a stable and predictable scope of their legitimate action and consolidate barriers to the 
encroachment of other institutions and actors. This long-term dynamic unfolds itself 
following a logic of crystallization of the appropriate behavior1 with respect to both 
formal rules and precedents and delineates the legitimate scope of action of actors 
embodying functions and taking actions in the name of certain objectives allegedly 
serving a democratically agreed upon vision of the common good2.
However, my perspective will be a lateral one, in that I wish to draw some pertinent 
conclusions about the institutional dimension and the durability of this arrangement 
essential to democratic consolidation by assessing two interrelated issues. First, for 
the first half of the 1983-1994 decade, the analysis of the capacity of the government 
to respond to a regime crisis produced by radical pressures coming from the civil 
society on the one side, and from the military personnel on the other, around the 
issue of criminal trials for human rights crimes. I will assess the capacity of the regime 
1 I borrow this concept from James G. MARCH, Johan P. OLSEN, ”The Logic of Appro-
priateness”, ARENA Center for European Studies, Working Papers , WP 04/09.
2 In this paper I am only interested in transformations towards democratic political 
orders and thus to institution-building dynamics in the horizon of values and norms of liberal 
democracies.
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in the management of this major challenge from the vantage point of the executive-
judiciary relationship in the mandate of Raul Alfonsin, the first democratic president 
and I will explore in the second part of this paper the dramatic deterioration of this 
relationship in the next presidential mandate, that of Carlos Menem. This latter point 
will allow to better approximate the sense of the lengthier process of institutional 
building and reform as a route of progressive formal and informal accommodation 
of political actors with the formal institutional constraints in a most difficult context, 
in an early democratizing stage during which new political actors are both the object 
and subject of the new rules of the game.
A growing scholarship concerned with the regime question1 in third wave 
democracies and focused particularly on the Latin American region2 has privileged 
an institutionalist revival among political scientists, preoccupied with issues like 
presidentialism3 in new and unconsolidated democracies, with a particular attention 
dedicated to legislative executive relationship and the institutional gridlocks at the 
national level4, electoral systems and their effects on the selection of candidates and 
on the new partisan systems5. This privileged concentration on the initial institutional 
choice, the result of either a process of negotiation among elites (authoritarian 
moderates and hardliners, opposition’s radicals and moderates, as Huntington’s 
game theoretic model set the standards and the various scholars privileged the 
modes of extrication and transition from dictatorship to democracy6) or of the evident 
1 Gerardo L. MUNCK, ”The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies”, 
World Politics, vol. 54, no. 1, October 2001, pp. 119-144.
2 IDEM (ed.), Regimes and Democracy in Latin America. Theories and Methods, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2007.
3 See the seminal article of Juan Linz at the beginning of the 1990s, Juan LINZ, ”The 
Perils of Presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy, Winter 1990, pp. 51-69, and the large mass 
of scholarship that followed (Juan LINZ, Arturo VALENZUELA, The Failure of Presidential 
Democracy, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994; M. Steven FISH, ”Stronger 
Legislatures, Stronger Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 17, no. 1, January 2006, pp. 5-20; 
Jose Antonio CHEIBUB, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,and Democracy, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2007 etc.) with sometimes significant amendments to Linz’s and his followers’ 
initial position. See for instance Matthew Soberg SHUGART, John M. CAREY, Presidents and 
Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
1992; see also Barbara GEDDES, Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994.
4 Gerardo L. MUNCK (ed.), Regimes and Democracy in Latin America... cit., The most important 
chapter of this collective work from the perspective set above, is the one by Matthew Soberg 
SHUGART and Royce CAROLL, ”Neo-Madisonian Theory and Latin American Institutions”, 
pp. 51-103.
5 Scott MAINWARING, ”Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy. The Difficult 
Combination”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 26, no. 2, July 1993, pp. 198-228; Jose Antonio 
CHEIBUB, Adam PRZEWORSKI, Sebastian M. SAIEGH, ”Government Coalitions and 
Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism”, British Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 34, no. 4, 2004, pp. 565-587.
6 From the seminal work edited by Guillermo O’DONNELL, Philippe SCHMITTER and 
Laurence WHITEHEAD, Transition from Authoritarian Rule, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1986 to more recent studies by Terry Lynn KARL, ”Dilemmas of Democratization in 
Latin America”, Comparative Politics, vol. 23, no. 1, October 1990, pp. 1-21; Gerardo L. MUNCK, 
Carol Skalnik LEFF, ”Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern 
Europe in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Politics, vol. 29, no. 3, 1997, pp. 343-362, 
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disequilibrium in favor of the democratic opposition, was driven by a legitimate 
concern for the survival of these new, young democracies, an apprehension that soon 
proved quite judicious, as the various cases of illiberal1, semi- or hybrid democracies2 
or more focused on Latin America, instances of delegative democracy3 illustrate it more 
recently.
The other strand of scholarship that organizes the intellectual horizon of my 
inquiry on the management of the issue of transitional justice in the limits set by 
the formal institutional setting, asks some difficult questions about the relationship 
between the process of democratic consolidation and the more short term transitional 
justice dilemmas centered on judicial, administrative and political measures about 
how to deal with the past. In most third wave democracies, these two issues were 
simultaneously the preoccupation of both elites and the society, even in such cases 
where one or both of them constituted only rhetorical issues and still await their 
attainment. Moreover, the impressive volume of scholarship dedicated to each of 
these two topics frequently relates one to the other, either trying to demonstrate that 
they are in a necessary manner connected and thus the progress in one dimension 
should be correlated with the progress in the other4 or, on the contrary, in order to 
illustrate how the two issues are essentially independent processes5 or even damaging 
to one another6.
From a comparative perspective, the case of the large degree of arbitrary violence 
perpetrated by the armed forces in Argentina during the 1976-1983 military juntas 
is just one instance of the Latin American experiences with military dictatorship 
and should be adapted in light of the various legal arrangements that the military 
juntas instituted in each national setting, and the various degrees to which the 
armed forces complied with the formal legal system or, on the contrary, preferred 
at times to act according to non-transparent orders along the military hierarchical 
chain of command. This observation is crucial to the extent that it illuminates a radical 
distinction between a rule-of-law abiding political order in a Kelsenian understanding 
of this principle and a state of arbitrary rule by sheer violence perpetrated by armed 
men7. This distinction is instructive both for the political theory of regimes and for the 
to very recent reassessments of the transitology paradigm in Carsten Q. SCHNEIDER, The 
Consolidation of Democracy. Comparing Europe and Latin America, Routledge, London, 2008.
1 Fareed ZAKARIA, ”The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, 
November-December 1997, pp. 22-43.
2 Larry DIAMOND,”Elections without Democracy, Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2, April 2002, pp. 21-35.
3 Guillermo O’DONNELL, ”Delegative Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 1, 
January 1994, pp. 55-69.
4 Anne SA’ADAH, ”Regime Change: Lessons from Germany on Justice, Institution 
Building, and Democracy”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 50, no. 3, June 2006, pp. 1-21.
5 Barahona DE BRITO, ”Truth, Justice, Memory, and Democratization in the Southern 
Cone”, in Paloma AGUILAR, Barahona DE BRITO, Carmen GONZALEZ-ENRIQUEZ, The 
Politics of Memory. Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2001, p. 151.
6 Jon ELSTER, ”On Doing What One Can: An Argument Against Post-Communist 
Restitution and Retribution”, in Neil KRITZ, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 1995, pp. 566-568.
7 For a thorough discussion of the notion of rule of law in democratic and nondemocratic 
regimes, see Robert BARROS, ”Dictatorship and the Rule of Law: Rules And Military Power in 
562
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. X • no. 3 • 2010
ANDREEA NICUŢAR
more pragmatic dimension of defining who is susceptible to be punished in the new 
democratic regime. In this latter respect, those who committed crimes perpetrated in 
a more rule abiding authoritarian regime are more likely to use the excuse of having 
followed the orders and thus reduce the range of liable perpetrators to just a handful 
of superior decision makers, whereas in the case of more arbitrary rule in authoritarian 
regimes the attribution of responsibility for perpetrating human rights violations can 
be more ”democratically” distributed to a wider range of actual perpetrators after the 
transition.
In the Argentine setting, the successful or, on the contrary, failed attempts 
to deal with the crimes of the past regime in its most egregious forms – torture, 
disappearances, murder, is a privileged indicator of the institutional strength of the 
new democratic regime, because the inherent logic of criminal trials as transitional 
justice is one of a confrontation between institutions of the state that should punish 
those individuals who, acting in the name of the state and formal institutions of the 
previous regime, committed heinous crimes against other individuals and groups. 
Thus, the institutional strength of the new democratic regime will also be discerned 
as a function of its capacity to punish the guilty all by discerning between individual 
culpability and institutional culpability (responsibility) and, furthermore, to punish 
without endangering the still fragile institutional setting. In this sense, the policies of 
transitional justice constitute a political act and a very difficult one, because the state 
is in the very uncomfortable situation of employing some institutions (usually the 
judiciary) for the assessment of the responsibility of other institutions or, more difficult 
still, for punishing the inappropriate (illegitimate, criminal) behavior of agents acting 
in the name of the very institution who years later has to condemn itself (the judiciary 
when responsible for helping criminal acts of a dictatorship). 
By democratization I understand in this article mainly a process of transformation 
of the relationship between the state and the society in the very peculiar context of the 
legacies of an extremely violent state terrorism perpetrated by the previous regimes 
(both the civilian regime of Isabel Peron and the three military juntas that followed), a 
process to which both civil society movements and political elites actively contributed 
since 1983. Similarly, in defining the concept of democratic consolidation I again consider 
the historic events that marked the period of the transition and the first years of the 
young democracy, marred by several rebellions of the armed forces threatening the new 
regime with the repetition of past military regimes. Thus, the Argentine democracy is 
to be considered a consolidated regime only after the institutionalization of the army 
and its definite confinement to the barracks and away from their traditional role in 
politics as the ultimate veto player1. 
Although this is not the only condition for this complex process, it is an essential 
provision for the existence of a durable democratic regime, and I understand this state 
of durability in the sense given by Carsten Q. Schneider for the background concept 
of consolidated democracy2: 
Pinochet’s Chile”, in Jose Maria MARAVALL, Adam PRZEWORSKI (eds.), Democracy and the 
Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, pp. 188-222.
1 Juan Carlos CALLEROS, The Unfinished Transition to Democracy in Latin America, Routledge, 
London, 2009, p. 116.
2 For his application of Giovanni Sartori’s theory of the three levels of abstraction of 
concepts to the study of democratization, see Carsten Q. SCHNEIDER, The Consolidation of 
Democracy…cit., p. 8.
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”A liberal democracy is consolidated if it is expected that it will persist (static 
notion of CoD). And, the consolidation of a liberal democracy is the process by 
which the time horizon of its expected persistence is extended (dynamic notion 
of CoD)”1.
Obviously, a discussion should be devoted to the concept of liberal democracy 
itself, but for the limited task I assumed in this paper, I will use this narrow definition 
in the present analysis of the post-authoritarian Argentine polity by analyzing what 
I consider an essential and common dilemma at the heart of both the process of 
democratization of state-society relations through the overcoming of the abuses of the 
state terrorism era, and equally critical to the process of institutional building through 
the construction of a stable and formally institutionalized relationship2 between the 
executive and the judiciary system. 
For the first dimension, that of the democratization of state-society relationship, 
the dilemma is related to the challenges posed by demands for transitional justice – 
and especially criminal justice against those responsible for human rights violations 
during the ”Dirty War”. For the second process, related to the institutional dimension, 
the predicament of the political elites was centered on the issue of the independence 
of the judiciary from the encroachment of the president. Although the two issues, that 
of transitional justice on one side, and of the independence of the judiciary, on the 
other, seem two highly heterogeneous topics given the time horizon of their expected 
importance (a rather short-term saliency for the former, a definitely long-term, 
constant saliency for the latter in keeping with Schneider’s definition of a consolidated 
democracy), I maintain that these two issues are worth being studied together in the 
context of the Argentine first democratic decade. This is the case because this period is 
defined by a high degree of uncertainty, in which actors and institutions operate under 
tremendous pressures concerning their very formation and consolidation3.
In other words, the Argentine post-transition period reveals a rare opportunity 
for social scientists to witness the negotiations between emerging elites unaware 
or incompletely aware of the balance of power between them, in a highly unstable 
political institutional environment, that is, a formative period for the future political 
system. I define the post-transition period as a formative one and I tentatively delimit 
this period as the first democratic decade, from the first free elections in December 
1983 and up to the 1994 agreement for a constitutional reform (the Olivos Pact) 
between the two main political parties.
In light of my theoretical rational choice model borrowed from Geddes (2002), 
this first decade is defined as formative because during this time the new political 
elites, characterized as rational actors pursuing their goals (first order preferences) – 
1 Ibidem, p. 12.
2 I advance this condition of a consolidated democracy as opposed to those practices 
defined by Guillermo O’Donnell as informal rules [so] ”widely shared and deeply rooted 
[that] it may be said that these rules (rather than the formal ones) are highly institutionalized”, 
see Guillermo O’DONNELL, ”Illusions about Consolidation”, in Larry Jay DIAMOND, Marc 
F. PLATTNER, The Global Divergence of Democracies, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 2001, p. 119. O’Donnell further gives the example of clientelism as an ”extremely 
influential, informal and sometimes concealed institution”. 
3 Terry Lynn KARL, ”Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”, Comparative Politics, 
vol. 23, no. 1, October 1990, pp. 1-21/pp. 6-12.
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the accumulation of power and their survival in positions of decision making 
authority – employ various strategies (second-order preferences) or policies in order to 
further their most-valued goals1, and these strategies are subject to a high degree of 
instability, that I attribute to two main causes. First, the interaction of each actor’s 
sphere of preferences with the sphere of preferences of contending political actors 
(the opposition), a competition in which the winner will be the actor most capable 
of learning from past errors and employ the institutional environment to his own 
advantage. The second cause of instability is the institutional environment, which 
is both a source of constraints on the behavior of the elites and a privileged field of 
competition of these actors contending for the very (re)definition of the institutional 
building through strategic reforms of some key institutions. As I will further analyze in 
the empirical section of this paper, an essential point of contention of the new political 
elites in this formative period was the sphere of autonomy of the judiciary in the 
new political game, and the stage of this contention was the nature and scope of the 
Supreme Court’s prerogatives, particularly in relation to the progressive definition of 
the scope of the executive function by the very divergent personalities of its first two 
office-holders, Raul Alfonsin and Carlos Menem. 
I find Geddes’ theoretical model a particularly useful one in analyzing the 
post-transitional Argentine period as a formative interval for the creation of future 
patterns of elites’ interactions and of institutional building in the particular instance 
of the executive-judiciary relationship, and, given my emphasis on the interaction 
of rational political actors in this period, I will conceptualize their interactions as 
an intra-elite competition for the definition of veto players of the Argentine polity. 
Geddes’ theoretical model makes a very convincing case for the analysis of actors’ 
behavior and interactions as players essentially motivated by their specific goals 
(gaining and maintaining power and the benefits deriving from its use), but, and 
most importantly, as players inside a given set of institutional constraints and inputs 
of contending actors, that they have to partly accommodate, and partly bend: 
”Contrary to the claims of critics, most rational choice arguments about 
political behavior actually give primacy to institutions and other contextual 
circumstances as causes of outcomes. ’The rational choice approach focuses its 
attention on the constraints imposed on rational actors – the institutions of a society 
[…] Individual action is assumed to be optimal adaptation to an institutional 
environment, and interaction between individuals is assumed to be an optimal 
response to each other. Therefore, the prevailing institutions […] determine the 
behavior of the actors, which in turn produces political and social outcomes’”2.
This rational choice model that I adapted for this analysis, focused on actors’ goals 
and their strategies for attaining them, but equally focused on the institutional and 
contingent constraints on actors’ strategies3, uses George Tsebelis’ definition of veto 
1 Barbara GEDDES, Paradigms and Sand Castles, Theory Building and Research Design in 
Comparative Politics, University of Michigan, 2003, pp. 177-206.
2 Ibidem, p. 188. George TSEBELIS, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990.
3 I emphasize this so as to point to Geddes’ effort to illuminate a useless confusion concerning 
rational choice models, as the result of terminological misunderstandings. As she nicely and 
succinctly disentangles some concepts, preferences should be considered separately from the 
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players as ”an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy 
decision”1. I will adapt it, however, to the peculiar democratic state of Argentina in its 
1983-1994 decade and pay attention to the informal strategies some actor will employ 
in order to control the exercise of the veto rights of other actors and draw a conclusion 
only at the end of this paper on the issue of the exact number of veto players in the 
post-1983 Argentine polity.
Carsten Schneider’s conceptualization of consolidated democracy is differentiating 
between multiple levels of analysis of its static and dynamic dimensions, these 
levels being institutional, attitudinal, and behavioral2, and he opts for a behavioral 
perspective on COD applied to a medium number of cases in his study. However, he 
underlines the fact that the choice of a unilevel or, on the contrary, multi-level analysis 
is highly dependent on the number of cases under scrutiny and that a multi level 
analysis is a pertinent choice only for very small N studies: 
”Despite its focus on empirically observable behavior of politically relevant 
actors, my concept is embedded in institutional theory because actors are required 
to perpetuate through their behavior those formal and informal institutions that 
are at the core of any democratic regime. Hence, democracy is consolidated 
’whenever the enforcers of democratic institutions themselves can be counted 
on with very high probability to behave in ways compatible with, and oriented 
toward, the perpetuation of formal institutional rules’”3.
This conceptualization of democratic consolidation at the institutional, attitudinal 
and behavioral levels explicitly follows the path breaking theory by Linz and Stepan 
in 19964 and sees this process as both the result of a cost-benefit calculation of the elites, 
reaching the conclusion that the costs of anti-system attitudes are much higher than 
the costs of negotiating inside the democratic game, and also, and essentially, the 
result of a lengthier process of habituation with the democratic rules, habituation or 
learning on the part of the elites and the society at large, thus making democracy the 
”only game in town”. 
Considering my choice for a single case study of Argentina’s first post-transitional 
decade and the two main issues I have selected for capturing the political processes of 
strategies to attain them, which aren’t always the most preffered path for the actors or their 
supporters: ”Within rational choice arguments, politicians’ policy and institutional preferences 
are strategic behaviors aimed at achieving their goal of remaining in office. Policy preferences may 
alter radically in response to changed circumstances, but this does not imply that preferences, in 
the rational choice sense, have changed […] Policy and institutional preferences are always endogenous 
in rational choice arguments, as critics claim they should be; but they are called strategies, not preferences”, 
see Barbara GEDDES, Paradigms and Sand Castles…cit., p. 183 (my italics).
1 George TSEBELIS, ”Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, 
no. 3, July 1995, pp. 289-325/p. 293.
2 Carsten Q. SCHNEIDER, The Consolidation of Democracy, cit., p. 14.
3 S.E. HANSON, ”Defining Democratic Consolidation”, in R.D. ANDERSON Jr, M.S FISH, 
S.E. HANSON, P.G. ROEDER (eds.) Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2001, pp. 126–151, quoted in Carsten Q. SCHNEIDER, The Consoli-
dation of Democracy, cit., p. 16.
4 Juan LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996.
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democratization and consolidation, I find that a rational choice explanation as I already 
described it above, attentive both to elites’ choices and the institutional settings, goes 
in the same sense as Schneider’s and Linz and Stepan’s multi-level analysis, at the 
intersection between institutional, behavioral and attitudinal dimensions.
This paper will cover the period during Raul Alfonsin’s (Union Civica Radical) 
presidential mandate and that of his successor and member of the main competitor 
political party (Partido Justicialista, the Peronist party), Carlos Menem, and see how 
the democratization of state-society relations through measures of criminal justice and 
the issue of institutional reform and particularly the independence of the judiciary, 
were dealt with by the two presidents. As I already stated in the introductory part, far 
from being two separated issues, the two are very much dependent on one another, in 
the sense that generally, changes in one dimension are also revelatory of some changes 
in the other. Moreover, I hypothesize that in the unconsolidated Argentine democracy 
of the 1980s and 1990s, the degree of activism of the courts in punishing human rights 
perpetrators is indicative of the independence of the judiciary and any regression 
of this activism is to be expected as a result of exogenous pressures on this branch. 
Although this litmus test will serve my inquiry for a significant part of the period 
covered, the solution found to this topical challenge posed to the new regime does 
not exhaust the more durable question of the independence of the judiciary. However, 
by privileging a period of crisis I hope to extract some pertinent observations about 
the manner in which new political actors (Carlos Menem) will alter the institutional 
relationship between the executive and the judiciary as a direct lesson extracted from 
the experiences of their predecessors (Raul Alfonsin).
Although the observation concerning the relationship between the independence 
of the judiciary and the adoption of transitional justice measures is not a surprising one, 
as I will make it apparent in the historic description of events relating to Argentina’s 
experience, what I think it’s original in my paper and significantly contributing to the 
already massive scholarship dedicated to the Argentine democratization is the connection 
I establish between the two dimensions announced in the first part, the democratization 
of the state-society relationship through recognition of past wrongs and punishment of 
state crimes and the institutional dimension of democratic consolidation. 
In other words, I operate in this paper with multiple temporalities and this should 
contribute to a diachronic perspective on the process of democratic consolidation of 
Argentina, as I identify 1) a short term and highly dramatic horizon set by transitional 
justice as a societal demand and equally as a necessary strategy of the new polity in 
order to institutionalize the army and confine it to a more limited scope of legitimate 
action and 2) a long term process of elite negotiations and progressive accommodation 
in the search of a stable institutional arrangement both legitimate (accepted by all as 
the only game in town) and also, preferably, one aiming at assuring the respect of rule 
of law and of the principle of checks and balances. This latter point is all the more 
important in light of the considerable scholarship focusing on the significant dangers 
posed by a strong executive in a young democracy, as I briefly mentioned in the 
introduction. In this sense, although this largely goes beyond my present inquiry, the 
Argentine experience with the institutional reform of the judiciary and the executive 
serves for a comparative perspective in the larger continental perspective and maybe 
even for some post-Soviet presidential regimes, whereas its experience of significant 
successes in transitional justice through criminal trials could be readily integrated 
in the comparative analysis of other countries dealing with human rights crimes 
perpetrated by ancient regimes.
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The two time horizons will intersect as a double perspective on the competition 
of the elites concerning the broader issue of the scope of the judiciary (the degree 
of its independence in the new polity) and the issue of transitional justice, and the 
conceptualization of this relationship, finally, as one instance of the essentially political 
struggle for the control of the number of veto players in the new polity. The privileged 
lieu for the observation of the number of veto players in the Argentine politics is the 
executive seat, a function that proved to be a highly sensitive one to the personality of 
its incumbent, as I will show further in my discussion. Given the constantly imminent 
encroachment of the executive on the judiciary, whose resorts I will deal with equally, 
the unresolved number of veto players in the Argentine polity is responsible for a 
constant shift between regime instability and government instability1. I will proceed in 
my analysis with a constant concern with this issue as well, as this could provide 
an additional measure of approximation of the democratic consolidation and predict 
probable institutional sources of tension in the long term.
The first free elections in 1983 brought to power Raul Alfonsin, the presidential 
candidate of the UCR (Union Civica Radical), a moderate social-democrat politician, 
and an activist of human rights during the military regime. His surprising victory over 
the Peronist candidate, largely expected to win the first elections due to the support 
of the blue collar workers traditionally linked to the Peronist movement, was actually 
greatly enhanced by his rigid position during the presidential campaign in favor of 
criminal trials against army officers during the last military dictatorship and thus 
refusing any form of amnesty in their favor. During the first month of his mandate, 
a National Commission on Disappeared Persons, CONADEP (La Comisión Nacional 
Sobre la Desaparición de Personas) was formed in order to reveal the real dimensions 
of the human rights crimes of the four military juntas (under the army leaders General 
Jorge Rafael Videla, General Roberto Viola, General Leopoldo F. Galtieri and General 
Reynaldo Bignone as presidents) and establish both the identities of the victims and 
of the perpetrators, without however endowing the CONADEP with the right to file 
official complaints against those suspected of such crimes and could only help the 
work of the prosecutors.
However, the most burdensome set of measures, also initiated immediately after 
Alfonsin’s nomination, focused on denying the impunity that the last military junta 
tried to institutionalize in an amnesty law in the last days of its rule and bring to 
justice the cases of the most serious crimes against human rights. On April 28, 1983, 
after the start of negotiations with the political parties for the reintroduction of free 
elections, the last Junta issued a ”Final Document on the struggle against subversion 
and terrorism” and tried to amend the Constitution in order to institutionalize an 
implicit amnesty law for most military personnel, under the pretext of due obedience. 
Furthermore, just two weeks before the presidential elections were held in December 
1983, the Junta issued a new, explicit amnesty law, La Ley de Pacificacion Nacional 
that, given the total loss of legitimacy of the army, had the contrary effect, giving 
a boost to Alfonsin’s campaign against the military impunity2, at a time when the 
Peronist candidate, largely considered the winner, declared to be more willing to 
1 George TSEBELIS, ”Decision Making in Political Systems…cit.”, p. 289.
2 Americas Watch Report, Truth and Partial Justice in Argentina: An Update, April 1991, 
p.15, report available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/78241 (AWR from now on), (accessed 
on 1.05.2010).
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negotiate an amnesty with the army leaders. Thus, I can say that Alfonsin mandate 
was to a large extent a carte blanche given to the candidate who seemed decided to a 
higher degree to ignore the amnesty forced by the officers in the Constitution. 
In a slow paced but thoughtful strategy, Alfonsin first sent a legislative initiative 
to the Congress which ordered the opening of all cases of human rights violations 
under the authority of the Supreme military council, thus allowing the military body 
to administer justice to its own members found guilty along the chain of command, 
that is, setting limits to the scope of justice, by actually focusing only on high ranking 
military officers. However, this presidential initiative was modified in the Congress, 
where the UCR enjoyed a relative majority, so that, irrespective of the results in the 
military courts, the cases should also be sent to the civilian Federal Courts of Appeal 
after 180 days of consideration by the military courts. Without exception, the rulings 
of the military courts issued exculpatory conclusions for each officer or police worker 
under accusation, and thus the civilian courts took over the cases and just six months 
after the issuing of Alfonsin’s law, 2 000 criminal complaints had been brought before 
the civilian Courts of Appeal. However, the obvious reluctance of the Military Tribunal 
to prosecute those brought to its attention was dealt with by each Federal Court of 
Appeal with various degrees of severity, sometimes responding with a strong activism 
(in Buenos Aires Province) or, on the contrary, with great lenience (for example in the 
province of Cordoba), allowing for the extension of the 180 days proviso1.
In December 1994 the leaders of the military Juntas were brought to justice before 
the Federal Court of Buenos Aires, and after four months of hearings, most of these 
leaders were sentenced to life imprisonment or lengthy periods of detention and loss 
of civil rights. Also, and most significantly for future trials all along the next two 
decades, the court issued the order to further the prosecution of all those suspected 
of human rights crimes and who ”were in command of the areas and sub-areas of 
defense during the campaign against subversion and against all those who had 
operational responsibility in the actions”2, thus pronouncing a negative verdict to 
the request of numerous officers to be exculpated for simply following orders from 
superiors, according to the ”obediencia debida” doctrine. However, this legal action 
didn’t stop here, and reached the Supreme Court in 1986 at the request of both the 
Junta members and of the prosecutor, the latter hoping for longer terms against some 
officers. Finally, the Supreme Court backed the rulings of the Federal Court of Buenos 
Aires and proved no leniency in favor of the accused. 
What is crucial at this stage of the prosecutions, is that the initial intention to 
prosecute the highest military personnel in an essentially symbolic gesture of the new 
political elites, triggered in fact an avalanche of prosecutions of officers of inferior 
ranking, and the dimensions of this activism of the lower courts, of their prosecutors 
and of the Argentines suddenly founding the courage to file complaints that evidently 
seemed to be effective, backed by a judiciary willing to take the cases, proved to go 
beyond the boundaries set by Alfonsin and his team. Thus, the executive’s initial move 
was first modified by the rulings of the Congress, when this body decided to make 
mandatory the appeals to the Federal Courts, and subsequently by the judiciary, when 
the courts started to take more and more cases of crimes perpetrated by all kinds of 
military and police workers, irrespective of their ranking or of their responsibility in 
giving orders or simply following them.
1 AWR, p. 24.
2 The Federal Court pronouncement, in AWR, p. 29.
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At the beginning of 1986, this avalanche of judicial activism started to stir the 
ranks of the military, which in turn pressured the executive to find a balance between 
the societal demands for justice and the military threats with rebellions and the end 
of the young democracy. Thus, in April 1986, the Minister of Defense encouraged the 
General Prosecutor of the Supreme Military Council to limit its accusations only to 
those cases in which the responsibility of the accused was evident, and to make efforts 
to shorten the processes, in order to calm the soldiers in the barracks. As the legal 
specialists Enrique Dahl and Alejandro Garro, who worked with the prosecutor of 
the Buenos Aires Federal Court observe, the Ministerial Directive was in fact a form 
of amnesty for those accused and for whom it wasn’t immediately evident that they 
exceeded the orders received1. This order, if applied by the courts, had to ignore most 
of the cases of abuses against civilians in the ”Dirty War”. 
This situation illustrates how the judiciary’s activism can still be eluded by one 
simple executive move, through which the key actor – the prosecutor – is called to 
modify his initial strategy (retribution corresponding to the gravity of the crimes) by 
extraneous motives and objectives, more political in nature, dictated by short-term 
urgencies of the political context. In 1986, the political context urged the executive to 
temper the activism of the judiciary in order to avoid a new coup d’État. In light of this 
imminent threat, made evident by some local revolts in various regions of the country, 
Alfonsin took a decisive step on December 24, 1986, by issuing the Full Stop Law (Ley 
de Punto Final). This decree ordered the blocking of all charges brought by victims 
and of all summonses of the courts ”related to the establishment of violent methods of 
political action”2 after a 60-day interval. Nevertheless, the decree explicitly exempted 
from this ruling any case that dealt with the kidnapping and transfer of minors and 
other crimes without any justification. 
As the two witnessing experts underline, this executive decree turned against 
its initiators. ”By shifting the burden to the courts to permit accused murderers and 
torturers to escape prosecution, the law backfired on the government”3, because most 
civilian courts mobilized to such a degree in order to include the highest number of 
cases before the 60-day deadline, that very few judges profited from their traditional 
right to have the month of January free, and instead produced a higher number 
of cases to be submitted to prosecution than in the absence of Alfonsin’s decree. A 
further pressure coming from the Minister of Defense through the General Prosecutor 
asked the Federal Courts to deal only with those cases of the most grave human rights 
violations (kidnapping of minors, and other similar ”atrocities”), thus in fact repeating 
the Full Stop Law’s wordings.
However, this third attempt of the executive to block the activism of the courts was 
actually a form of recognition of its lack of power over the judiciary branch, which in 
turn backfired on the executive’s legitimacy in its negotiations with the army officers 
threatening to rebel. At this stage, in the spring of 1987, Alfonsin already had lost 
the support of a significant part of the civil society because of his initiatives in favor 
of partial amnesties, and seemed a weak president in the eyes of the military, given 
his inability in curbing the activity of the Federal Courts, backed by a majority of the 
1 Neil KRITZ (ed.), Transitional Justice, How Emerging Democracies reckon with Former Regimes, 
US Institute of Peace, Washington, 1995, p. 360.
2 Ibidem, p. 361.
3 Ibidem, p. 362.
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Supreme Court. In light of this latter point, the 1987 Easter rebellion of various sectors 
of military officers in Buenos Aires and in other provinces is a significant indicator of 
the incomplete institutionalization of the army in the new game and its rules, and offers 
an explanation for the radical change of policy in the sphere of transitional justice on the 
part of Raul Alfonsin, the candidate who in 1983 won the presidential seat for promising 
resolute rulings against the human rights criminals. In the face of the serious menace 
posed by the lower ranking officers’s revolt against the continuation of trials and the 
conviction of numerous military and police personnel that, they argued, only followed 
the orders along the hierarchical line of command. The carapintada (the soldiers with 
painted faces) revolt was soon defused, following a visit of the president to one of the 
bases of the insurrectionists, after which Alfonsin returned to the Plaza de Mayo, the 
lieu de mémoire of the human rights activists, and calmed the worried citizens gathered 
there, letting them know that democracy was still in place.
Even so, very soon after these events, the legislative issued the Law No. 23521 at 
the initiative of the executive, known as the law of due obedience (obediencia debida), 
that had to interrupt the justice cascade triggered in the civilian courts, by introducing 
some amendments brought from the Code of Military Justice, basically stating that 
the prosecution will be lifted for any one ”who did not have decision making capacity 
or who did not participate in the formulation of the orders”, thus covering crimes like 
torture, murder, arbitrary arrest and the refuse of the habeas corpus demanded by the 
relatives of the victims1. The new law’s scope was so broad, that most of the accused 
and those cases still pending on the gathering of proofs became from one day to the 
next cases out of the reach of the courts and most of those found guilty of serious 
crimes became innocent, despite any proof, however evident, of their actual crimes, 
by being transformed in mere instruments of a handful of generals who formulated 
the big lines of the repression. Moreover, the law prevented the opening of new cases 
in situations in which the accused was not defined as a person responsible with the 
formulation of the actual criminal plans and commands. This radical change of attitude 
of the executive, averse to the initial promises for justice in favor of the victims, led to 
a split between the five judges of the Supreme Court.
The main point of tension inside the Supreme Court centered on the complaint 
furthered by the human rights groups against the due obedience law, because this 
law actually violated the principle of separation of powers2. One of the Supreme 
Court judges, the representative of the Peronist party, nominated by Raul Alfonsin 
at the beginning of his mandate as a pledge for his neutrality, considered that the 
legislative initiative encroached on the proper prerogative of the judiciary, because 
“the due obedience law prevented judges from deciding whether the circumstances 
described in the law (if the accused was responsible for giving orders or was simply 
an unconscious follower of anonymous orders from above, m.n.) actually occurred, 
by creating a conclusive presumption3 and thus imposing a preordained opinion on 
a supposedly independent judge. Despite the final decision of the Supreme Court in 
favor of the legislative act, it was evident that this decision was a political one, whatever 
1 Kathryn LEE CRAWFORD, ”Due Obedience and the Rights of Victims”, in Neil KRITZ 
(ed.), Transitional Justice…cit., p. 364.
2 Ibidem, p. 368.
3 Or an irebuttable presumption, ”a presumption of law that cannot be rebutted by evidence 
and must be used despite any evidence to the contrary”, see http://www.lectlaw.com/def/
c205.htm for further discussion of this concept (accessed on 1.05.2010).
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the moral arguments on which it stood (the most powerful being the one urging for 
the full stop of the trials in order to appease the officers and preserve the democratic 
regime). The most evident acknowledgment of this observation is the argument 
furthered by Raul Alfonsin in 1993, four years after the end of his mandate: 
”The moral legitimacy of measures such as the Do Obedience and the Full 
Stop Laws depend on whether their consequences are socially beneficial”1.
This radical change in policy preferences in the second part of Alfonsin’s mandate 
is all the more dramatic for him considering the fact that he also had to deal with a 
strong opposition at the time, coming from his own party, the UCR and that this 
move obviously affected his public image and any future electoral bid. Nevertheless, 
the president’s decision was at that point in time considered to be the best way to 
balance the two demands, the one coming from the society (truth and justice for the 
victims and their survivors) and another one coming from an informal veto player, 
and an irregular one for that matter, too weak to control the new democratic game 
(as opposed to the Brazilian and the Chilean case, in which the army kept a strong 
foothold in the new democracies as constitutional veto players2), but still sufficiently 
strong to impose its view on selected policies strictly dealing with its integrity as a 
body. However, it is notable in the Argentine case the fact that the breadth of this 
dimension of transitional justice, the criminal trials, obviously the most difficult to 
accomplish in any democratizing setting, proved to be an exceptionally large one in 
comparison with similar experiences in the South American continent or in the post-
communist regimes. Although the merits for the initiation of this exemplary process 
of criminal justice belong to an active president who triggered both the legislative and 
the judiciary activism in this matter, at a certain moment in time, this process gained a 
stimulus that put it on its own tracks and led to very much unexpected developments 
for all the important actors. 
In the next section I will briefly illustrate how this process of autonomization was 
made possible by the initial decision of the executive to secure total independence for 
the judiciary branch, and also taking into consideration another crucial variable: the 
very low degree of participation and institutionalization of the judiciary in the previous, 
authoritarian regime.
Immediately after the transition from an authoritarian rule, two essential issues 
relating to the autonomy of the justice system are (1) the quality of judiciary body 
both as a set of professionals endowed with sufficient means to act according to their 
mission and as a group of individuals autonomous from exogenous pressures; and (2) 
the legal system under use. In the Argentine case, these two issues didn’t burden the 
new democratic regime because the ancient regime made very little efforts to subdue 
the justice system and use it in its repressive mechanisms during the ”Dirty War” and 
because during the first months of the Alfonsin mandate the executive took significant 
steps to guarantee its independence. 
In what concerns the legacies of the prior authoritarian regime, these were 
minimal because the military juntas did little efforts to give the appearances of acting 
1 Raul Alfonsin, in Neil KRITZ (ed.), Transitional Justice...cit., p. 381.
2 Or institutional veto players in George TSEBELIS, ”Decision Making in Political Systems…
cit.”, p. 302.
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according to the rule-of-law principles. Immediately after the 1976 coup, the first 
military junta issued a number of ”institutional acts” that were supposed to add 
to the constitutional act and allow them to elude the formal rules of a democratic 
regime, given their fight against terrorism. This further allowed them to make arrests, 
imprisonments and even to administer justice in cases involving civilians according 
to the military criminal code and to some arbitrary amendments to the old criminal 
code and also, most significantly, without accepting any form of accountability for 
their acts. That means, for instance that the authorities were never made to respect 
the habeas corpus principle during that period, requested by the relatives of those 
arrested without warrant, and could even deny having someone in their custody. 
However, even these ”institutional acts” imposed by the junta generals were actually 
ignored, because the commands were in fact given following secret plans and orders 
along the chain of command to inferiors1. 
Moreover, more than 80% of all judges were forced to resign soon after the 
installation of the first military junta, thus making possible for the preservation of 
the integrity of much of the judiciary body after 1983 and a swift return to the old 
Constitution and legal codes. This swift transformation was therefore made possible 
by the inability of the army to institutionalize itself and erect a stable political regime, 
and instead only succeeded in maintaining a short-lived ”political situation”2, that 
finally collapsed at the moment when the civilian elites decided to collaborate in 
reinstalling a democratic system.
And as to the first measure taken by Alfonsin concerning the legal body, these were 
strategic in consolidating its integrity and autonomy. The president acted in this sense 
first by nominating the five members of the Supreme Court from the entire political 
specter, including a Peronist judge and other representatives of the opposition parties, 
and he rapidly moved to promote young judges and prosecutors, irrespective of their 
political leaning, free from any injunction from the military elite. A comparison with 
similar political situations in Brazil, Chile or Uruguay reveals one essential condition 
that set the process of criminal trials on the right path in Argentina, and lacked to 
various degrees in all the other countries:
”Argentina’s transitional justice efforts were far more radical than Brazil’s. 
The lack of integration of and consensus between judicial and military elites was 
exploited by civilian politicians who were able to divide and rule both corporate 
groups. The truth commission and the trials shattered the wall of silence around 
the dirty war disappearances and punctured the military’s impunity. Elected 
presidents moved aggressively to slash military prerogatives, prestige, and 
resources, while purging the judiciary and maintaining its subordination to the 
judiciary. Argentina’s TJ has not been entirely successful in that it is subject to 
the progressive-regressive cycle alluded to earlier, in which measures taken by 
one government are undone by its successor. But it has not been restricted by the 
immobilism that I find in the Brazilian case”3.
1 AWR, p. 6.
2 Gerardo L. MUNCK, Authoritarianism and Democratization, Soldiers and Workers in Argentina, 
1976-1983, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1998, see especially 
chapter 5, ”The Dynamics of a Political Situation in Argentina, 1980-1982”, pp. 105-132.
3 Anthony W. PEREIRA, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. 
Political (In)justice, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2005, p. 167.
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Thus, the (political) space left open by the complete delegitimation of the army 
after the seven year dictatorship allowed for the isolation of this actor in the new 
democratic game, a situation which proved impossible in Brazil or Chile, where 
the army maintained the role of a constitutional veto player beyond the moment of 
transition1, enjoying discretionary power in some ”reserved domains”2. As Pereira 
succinctly puts it: 
”If in Argentina wholly extrajudicial repression was the norm, Chilean 
repression from 1973 to 1978 was a military usurpation of judicial power, with 
the complicity of the legal establishment“3.
However, the comparative success of Argentina in dealing with the crimes of 
the military dictatorship must be balanced by a pragmatic analysis of its regime 
instability during Alfonsin’s mandate. This instability and the two main occasions 
of radical menace against its integrity are to be considered as consequences of the 
presence of one informal veto player – the army, and one constitutional veto player – 
the Courts (Supreme Court in final instance) whose formal prerogatives are checked 
by the executive along partly irregular lines, stirring the suspicion of encroachment 
on its activity when the ”urgency of the day” requires so, and thus paving the way for 
the arbitrary use if this justification for future presidents, as I will illustrate it in the 
case of Carlos Menem’s pervasive use of this precedent. 
In a final observation before opening the analysis of the second half of the decade 
under study, when do political actors (especially the presidents) decide to act with 
sufficient restraint so as to allow a sufficient scope of action to the judiciary as an 
additional veto player, and when do they decide to deny the judiciary such scope of 
action by ad-hoc measures? This question relates to a growing scholarship focused 
on Latin American presidential regimes and particularly to the question of ”when 
do politicians take actions to promote the development of more powerful judicial 
branches”4.
The new general elections brought to power the Peronist party (Partido 
Justicialista) and the president Carlos Menem. As a consequence of the experience of 
the crisis-ridden UCR mandate and presumably also because of the pact between the 
army and Peronistas in 1983, agreeing to amnesty the all crimes of the dictatorship, 
Menem issued in 1989 a presidential pardon for those accused of human rights abuses. 
A much more incisive figure, Menem started a very active mandate during which he 
crushed a last military uprising in 1990 and transformed the executive, in the locus of 
effective authority over the entire political system.
In order to put an end to any future threat coming from the men in uniform, he 
reduced the army budget, abolished the draft and cut all financial means that until then 
1 Manuel Antonio GARRETON,”Chile 1997-1998: The Revenge of Incomplete Democra-
ti zation”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 75, no. 2, April 
1999, pp. 259-267.
2 Juan LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation…cit., 
pp. 205-207.
3 Anthony W. PEREIRA, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil...cit., 
p. 168.
4 Jodi FINKEL, ”Judicial Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How Electoral Incentives Shape 
Institutional Change”, Latin American Research Review, vol. 39, no. 3, 2004, pp. 56-80/p. 57.
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permitted the military to dispose of significant resources guaranteeing its autonomy 
from civilian control1. By this, Menem probably responded to another major problem 
of Latin American countries in general, that is, the corruption enhanced or at least 
tolerated by the participation of high ranking officers in civilian affairs. This action 
could also aim at further legitimating the state and its civilian leadership as the unique 
decision-maker in the question of the budget and as the only spender of the public 
money, insulating the army in a much weaker, dependent, position. Chile’s state-
owned copper mining industry and the military’s share in its profits could constitute 
a valid case for a larger comparison of the means by which the army assures for itself 
an independent position in its relationship with the government.
If the military question ceased to be a salient problem during Menem’s presidency, 
other democratic successes of the former Alfonsin executive became more and more 
fragile in the next decade. This is where the presidential system variable crucially 
intervenes. Menem’s first mandate, significantly helped by a strong majority in 
the Congress and the total support of all the labor unions’ leaders, who during his 
mandate refrained from the tactic of nation-large strikes, led to a pervasive use of 
the presidential prerogatives and finally to the abuse of its legal means especially in 
the relationship with the judiciary branch. In fact, the Supreme Court is a privileged 
terrain for the broader assessment of the grave deterioration in the quality of the 
Argentine democracy in the second half of this decade.
During the Alfonsin’s mandate, the Supreme Court enjoyed total independence 
and acted as a transparent and neutral actor of the political game. Its composition 
of moderate justices from both parties and some smaller political faction assured a 
sound and non politicized activity and acted according to the democratic principle 
of checks and balances2. Menem acted in the exact opposite direction, justifying his 
brutal interventions in the activity of the Supreme Court by invoking economic and 
social reforms much needed by the Argentinean society and which were slowed 
down by the activity of this institution. He not only interfered with its prerogatives, 
but also modified its structure, from initially five justices to nine, in order to forge 
a majority favoring his executive supremacy. He therefore nominated close friends 
and ex associates, as the new judges openly acknowledged their past collaboration3, 
together with their determination to support the president in taking completely the 
reins of power in order to further the economic reforms. This brutal move to modify 
the structure of the Supreme Court was a much debated issue at that moment, as this 
act was made possible by a number of irregularities, such as pressures exercised on 
some of the judges nominated by Alfonsin to retire or assume some ambassadorship 
functions aiming in the most see-through way to neutralize those members who 
opposed Menem’s policies, and when this strategy failed because of the staunch 
refusal of the judges to leave, Menem pushed this even further, by passing through 
the Peronista-controlled Congress the modification of the Court’s structure. From 
five judges, the new Court was set up to include nine members, and Menem swiftly 
nominated the four new judges. In response to such an obvious encroachment on 
the independence of the Court, one of the old judges decided to quit in protest, thus 
1 Scott MAINWARING, Frances HAGOPIAN, (eds.), The Third Wave of Democratization in 
Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p. 68.
2 Jodi FINKEL, ”Judicial Reform in Argentina in the 1990s...cit.”, p. 62.
3 Ibidem, p. 69.
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finally allowing the president to enjoy a secure majority. In this respect, it is significant 
to consider the explicit acknowledgement of one of the judges nominated by Menem 
with respect to the Court’s scope of activity:
”I cannot have an interpretation which is contrary to the government; I 
must have one which is favorable to its decisions, because it was elected by the 
people”, further adding that [the role of the Supreme Court is] ”to go along with 
the politics of the President”1.
An essential observation made by Christopher Larkins is that Menem’s strategy 
actually never intended to modify the prerogatives of the Court, so as to limit its 
jurisdiction or elude its opinion. On the contrary, the Court became the most solid 
instrument of legitimation of the president’s decisions, without any fear of being 
kept accountable. Thus, another comparison between the Alfonsin’s mandate and 
Menem’s mandate is the use and abuse of ”Decrees of Necessity and Urgency”2 by 
the two presidents. While Alfonsin made use of this power only ten times in almost 
six years, Menem used them for 545 times in six years. In this respect, Larkins 
notes that: 
”The constricted impartiality and insularity of the Argentine courts were 
evidently not accompanied by a reduced constitutional scope of authority. 
The Supreme Court continued to review cases on a wide array of issues […] 
Particularly, the court has set solid precedents on the extent of president’s decree 
authority, civil-military and federal-provincial relations […] The key difference 
is that on virtually all of these occasions, the supreme court’s decisions either 
directly supported or strongly favored the president’s policies”3.
By employing a very different strategy than the one used by the military juntas 
during the dictatorship, the president managed however to neutralize the judiciary. 
Instead of eluding the courts, and issuing some arbitrary ”institutional acts” as the 
army did, Menem employed a more subtle strategy of curbing this institutional 
obstacle by changing the very rules that shaped the judiciary body and assured its 
independence. The most dramatic observation in this sense is that the very large 
space of action open for Menem to modify the rules of the game was made possible 
not according to constitutional prerogatives of the presidential function, but by a 
convergence of contingent and advantageous situations. Enjoying a large Peronista 
legislative majority, Menem profited from this situation in order to pass executive 
decrees that weren’t actually constitutionally sanctioned, but a last resort possibility 
in cases of extraordinary circumstances:
1 Christopher LARKINS, ”The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina”, 
Comparative Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, July 1998, p. 429.
2 Delia Ferreira RUBIO, Matteo GORETTI, ”When the President Governs Alone. The 
Decretazo in Argentina, 1989-1993”, in Matthew SHUGART, John CAREY (eds.), Executive 
Decree Authority, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 33-61/p. 34 for a discussion 
of ”paraconstitutional decrees” and the disregard of rule of law principles by Carlos Menem’s 
excessive use of decrees (the phenomenon of decretazo).
3 Ibidem, p. 432. See also pp. 436-437 for a comparative assessment of the strategies to curb 
the independence of the judiciary in more authoritarian regimes.
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”NUDs (Need and Urgency Decrees) are decrees issued by the executive 
that regulate matters or adopt policies that usually are the responsibility of 
the Congress. When the President issues a new NUD, he ’makes law’, taking 
to himself the congressional authority to repeal and modify laws. Historically, 
NUDs have been justified by extraordinary crises or emergency situations”1.
This shows that Menem actually enjoyed a prerogative that he created for himself 
by arbitrary substitution of the Congress and, as Rubio and Goretti underline after 
careful analysis of more than 13 500 presidential acts, between 1989 and 1994, Menem 
used the NUDs explicitly in 166 cases (49%) of the instances, and without even 
assuming the title of a NUD in 170 cases (51%)2. And with respect to the relationship 
between the President and the Supreme Court, although the latter has the right to 
formulate an opinion on the constitutionality of the NUDs, the latter proved in fact to 
be a trustworthy carrier of the presidential will. It is most striking to see that the Court 
not only endorsed the presidential ”paraconstitutional” lawmaking prerogatives, 
but also offered a formal justification for his acts. As Goretti and Rubio observe, the 
Supreme Court in its enlarged version, redefined the notion of an emergency as: 
”An extraordinary situation that affects the economic and social order, with 
its effect of accumulated uneasiness, through scarcity, poverty and indigence, 
creating a state of necessity that requires solution”3.
This state of virtual neutralization of all competing institutional veto players in 
a context in which the legislative opposition was weak, unwilling or unable to block 
most of the presidential initiatives, led in 1994, before the end of Menem’s mandate, to 
an apparently surprising settlement between the two main parties, the Peronist party 
and the Union Civica Radical. This agreement, which provoked a massive wave of 
indignation and again proved to be extremely costly for the leader of the opposition, 
the ex-president Raul Alfonsin, was focused precisely on the issue of the independence 
of the judiciary. In exchange for the promise to guarantee the formation of a neutral 
body responsible for the nomination of prosecutors and to institutionalize the use 
of Necessity and Urgency Decrees with a dramatically narrower scope in the new 
constitution, Menem was allowed to initiate a constitutional reform allowing him to 
stand for reelection as president. Although the Olivos Pact was largely disapproved by 
the anti Peronist public, seen as a reprehensible concession made to an undemocratic 
president, the elite agreement’s objectives were actually an essential stage in the 
institutional building of the Argentine democratic regime after the 1983 transition, 
a reform that made the first step in redrawing the scope of legitimate authority of 
the essential figure of that system: the president. In essence, Menem was allowed to 
renew his mandate, but under tighter formal constraints on the presidential function 
and, most significantly, by reinstating the judiciary as a relevant actor in checking the 
executive. 
The rational calculation made by the main opposition actor, UCR, proved actually 
to bring only partial benefits as the compromise with the Peronist party was a serious 
blow to Alfonsin’s party that lost a significant part of the support of the human rights 
1 Delia Ferreira RUBIO, Matteo GORETTI, ”When the President Governs Alone…cit.”, p. 41. 
2 Ibidem, p. 43.
3 Ibidem, p. 55. 
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movements and of that large segment of the society that desired a further reform of 
state institutions and saw Menem as both a corrupt politician and the person most 
responsible for the impunity of the ”Dirty War”’s officers. Moreover, the president 
continued to exert strong informal pressures on the judiciary in the next mandate and 
the thorough institutional reforms Alfonsin hoped to encourage through the Olivos 
compromise were only partially accomplished.
Tsebelis’ 1995 path breaking study on veto players discussed only tentatively 
the role of the courts as such crucial actors in democratic regimes, and he made an 
observation that could be amended in light of the experience of Argentina. When 
stating that: ”An institutional player will not count as a veto player unless it has formal 
veto power”1, this general condition should be accompanied by an additional study, 
adapted to each institutional setting, pattern of elite structure and interactions and the 
presence or absence of informal veto players, to specify the various constraints and 
irregular forms of pressures exercised on the courts. In a similarly cautious manner, a 
study of the number of veto players in settings like the Argentine democracy should 
also take into consideration the distance between the formal endowment of the 
institutional actor under consideration and the actual scope of its activity. 
My aim in this paper was to search for a new perspective on a much discussed issue 
in comparative politics, that of institution building after a transition from dictatorship. 
Far from being an exhaustive study of this topic, this inquiry privileged the assessment 
of the viability of the relationship between the executive and the judiciary not by the 
analysis of the formal prerogatives of the two power branches, but by an evaluation of 
their capacity to confront a most challenging political dilemma of a post-authoritarian 
regime – criminal trials against human rights perpetrators, all the more difficult when 
they are military officers of a historically poorly institutionalized army. Although 
this topic continued to suffer radical changes after the end of the period covered in 
this paper and until very recently, in a spiral of convictions, amnesties, pardons and 
again convictions, the first decade of the Argentine democracy is a most interesting 
opportunity for the study of the ever unstable game of elite negotiations and variable 
degrees of accommodation with formal rules of a democratic political game whose 
shape is itself the major stake of elites’ interactions and negotiating strategies or 
second order preferences. But beside this contingent process of give and take, highly 
sensitive to the willingness of one key person – the president, to abide by the limits 
to his prerogatives, I are witnessing during this first democratic decade another 
crucial phenomenon, that of a progressive, equally unstable process through which 
institutions take shape and test the boundaries of their prerogatives by conflicts with 
one another. 
In this sense, the test of transitional justice proves to be a useful instrument of the 
performance of institutions. This is very well illustrated in Argentina’s experience of 
its first democratic decade during which multiple clashes between the judiciary and 
the executive and/or the legislative around the issue of criminal trials significantly 
influenced the form of the policies of transitional justice, with results very much 
different from the initial intention with which Alfonsin triggered a process he thought 
he will be able to keep under control. In this respect, Argentina is an ideal instance from 
which to draw valuable observations about contingency in policy making, especially 
about the weight of individual actors and groups (courageous or defiant enough) 
1 George TSEBELIS, ”Decision Making in Political Systems…cit.”, p. 305.
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to push the boundaries set by other actors and redirect a policy’s meaning towards 
new societal and political consequences. Argentina’s experience with transitional 
justice is in this respect a fascinating case of interactions between institutions, each 
with its own agenda (set by both its formal prerogatives and the values, interests 
and constraints that motivate it at a certain historical point in time), illuminating 
the above observation about contingency. The initial move made by the president 
Alfonsin in favor of a limited form of prosecution for very serious human rights 
violations suffered a significant change of track once the judiciary came in control of 
its execution, thus triggering new societal and political constraints on the executive 
caught between human rights movements’ expectations and the officers’ radical 
opposition to trials. This will lead to a strenuous clash between the three branches of 
power in a growing centrifugal game that will finally prove itself to be an essential 
test for the new institutional setting and determine both formal and legitimate and 
informal and highly illegitimate pressures for the change of this potentially stalemate 
situation in the future. The analysis of the pressures on the judiciary during Menem’s 
mandate can also help to understand more about the presidential function in a fragile 
democracy, despite a vibrant civil society that brought the transition to democracy 
in the first place. Despite legitimate expectations one could have drawn from the 
moderate mandate of Alfonsin with respect to the independence of the judiciary 
even in such critical instances like the military threats to the new democratic regime, 
Menem did not hesitate in subordinating the judiciary in his own service and much 
less did he suffer the consequences of his obviously corrupt and arbitrary conduct. 
On the contrary, the political context and the elites’ agreements led to the renewal 
of his mandate and to a deepening of his negative legacy for the Argentine polity, 
observable in patterns of individual and institutional attitudes until the present day. 
In the presidential mandate of Menem’s successor, Fernando de la Rua, a 
member of UCR, a new wave of judicial activism reconsidered the presidential 
amnesty decreed at the end of the 1980s. What is worth emphasizing in this new 
wave is that the untouchable presidential decree was simply overturned in a court of 
justice by a federal judge who declared the due obedience act and the amnesty simply 
”unconstitutional, null and void”1. I consider suggestive the fact that the judge acted 
as a prime-mover in neutralizing these formal obstacles to criminal prosecution and 
that the court’s decision did not met substantial efforts to be overturned from other 
actors. As Acuna observes, however, and I should corroborate this with the Chilean 
experience with international judicial activism, the attitude towards the prosecution 
of the four Argentine military juntas drastically modified among national political 
actors once the Spanish initiatives against Videla were met with strong approval by 
international bodies2.
1 Carlos ACUNA, ”Transitional Justice in Argentina and Chile: A Never-Ending Story?”, 
in Jon ELSTER, Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2006, p. 221. 
2 Ibidem.
